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Licensed to Thrive? Podcasting and Copyright Law in
Canada
Keith Sutherland†

I. Introduction

by different tariffs than commercial Internet broadcasters
or download services. The paper then goes on to explore
suggestions that have been made to better serve the
interests of rights holders, while also allowing more inexpensive access to users — the people who consume
(listen to or watch) podcasts — in the online environment.
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s a method of online content distribution, podcasting is a phenomenon rivalled only by the initial
wave of peer to peer (P2P) file sharing and the mainly
text-based ‘‘blogging’’ community. It allows individuals
to regularly have media content downloaded automatically to their computers, to be enjoyed at the user’s convenience. Like many technologies involving digital
media, podcasting gives rise to many issues about the
role and purpose of copyright: how can we give copyright holders their due without impeding access to culturally significant works of creativity and intellect, and
further, without stifling the continued development of
useful technology?

II. What Is Podcasting?

A

podcast can most closely be analogized to a radio
program that is distributed online and downloaded
onto a computer to be synched with an MP3 player for
listening. The name is an amalgam of the words ‘‘iPod’’
and ‘‘broadcasting’’ — the former being the ubiquitous
portable device manufactured by Apple that is mainly
marketed and used to play MP3 or other compressed
audio files. Despite its etymology, the term ‘‘podcasting’’
is a misnomer in two senses: first, podcasts can be played
on any portable media player (not just an iPod) or even
one’s personal computer; and second, podcasting is not
broadcasting in the traditional sense.

Besides the challenges podcasting shares with other
digital technologies, it has some relatively unique characteristics that merit special attention in the Canadian copyright system: specifically, its accessibility — just about
anyone can create a podcast — and its subscriptionbased content delivery. These aspects of podcasting not
only make it a widely used and growing form of content
distribution, but also one that has grown out of individual efforts and which is still closely connected to amateur and non-commercial individuals in online communities.

Creation and Distribution of Podcasts
In order to create the content of a podcast, a producer must use audio or video compression and editing
software. This aspect of podcasting is notable because
technological advances have made it possible for virtually anyone to access software to enable him or her to
create content of this nature. In essence, anybody can be
a radio station. This is relevant to a legal analysis of
podcasting issues, because unlike radio or television
broadcasting, the production and distribution of podcasts is extremely diffuse, ranging from teenage basement bloggers to major public and corporate entities.
Podcasting involves a ‘‘publish and subscribe’’
model. Creators can distribute audio or video files over
the Internet automatically via syndication, which refers
to making a part of a Web site available to other Web

This article examines podcasting and its specific
characteristics to see, first, where it fits within Canada’s
copyright law, and second, how the licensing regime for
musical works in Canada applies to podcasting. The discussion next turns to whether or not the current
licensing regime for podcasting is desirable in light of the
purpose of copyright in Canada, and with a view to the
various interests at stake: those of artists, in being paid,
and those of society, in enabling podcasters to access
material in order to produce their work. An examination
of the current and proposed licensing regime and its
implications leads to the conclusion that it is not very
feasible for amateur or non-commercial podcasters to
operate legally in Canada if they use musical content,
and that at the very least, podcasting should be covered
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sites to use. Usually the part of a Web site that is syndicated is a Web feed, which is a page containing content
items — for example headlines of weblog posts or major
news outlets, or links to MP3 audio content. 1 The most
popular format for Web feeds is RSS, which stands for
‘‘Really Simple Syndication’’. Syndication enables podcast creators to disseminate their podcasts with relative
ease to a wide audience: the podcast is posted at one
online source, but is made available to consumers
through every Web site that has a Web feed for that
particular podcast.
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Podcast Access and Consumption
The end users, those who will ultimately listen to or
watch a podcast, can download content directly from a
Web feed, for example, by clicking on a link on the feed
page. However, a unique aspect of podcasting is its that
users can subscribe to a Web feed by using an aggregator, which is a type of software that automatically
retrieves syndicated content (e.g., podcasts) from Web
feeds and downloads it onto the user’s computer. This
downloaded content can in turn be transferred to an
MP3 or media player, such as an iPod, for consumption
at the user’s leisure — hence the ‘‘iPod’’ in podcast.
The appeal of subscribing to podcasts through an
aggregator is that it vastly reduces the time and effort
needed for a user to keep track of new developments on
Web sites of interest. 2 One simply has to subscribe to a
Web feed and the aggregator regularly checks it for
updates, downloads the updates, and displays them all
on a single page for the user to see when next opening
the aggregator application. Because the downloading
occurs automatically, podcasts have the further advantages of getting rid of download wait times entirely, and
ensuring that high quality content (i.e., large files) can be
accessed instantaneously: your latest CBC podcast can be
downloaded onto your computer while you sleep, along
with daily news headlines and some video clips, for
instantaneous access in the morning. 3 Podcasting thus
provides the maximum amount of flexibility for people
to consume content how, when, and where they want.

Podcasts Compared to Other Online Content
Podcasting, as a publish and subscribe consumption
model, is distinct from other methods of content
delivery. Its closest substitute is streaming (also known as
webcasting), which involves on-demand delivery of
linear audio-video content over the Internet. 4 For
example, many radio stations webcast their programs
online simultaneously to their broadcast, or make shows
available for listening at other times.
The first and most important difference between
podcasting and streaming is its ‘‘time-shifting’’ characteristic. Streamed content can only be listened to at the
time of delivery, whereas podcasts can be downloaded
automatically and listened to many times. 5 From a user’s
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perspective this has two major advantages. First, the content can be listened to at will: there is no need for a user
to tune in to a favourite radio program at a specific time.
Second, once a podcast has been downloaded, it can be
rewound, paused, and listened to as many times as the
user wants without the risk that a stream will be broken
and need to be re-buffered to continue listening.
Podcasting also holds some significant advantages
for producers. First, time-shifting democratizes content
delivery by enabling individuals to easily put out content
that is automatically syndicated and delivered.
Streaming, as it is used by conventional broadcasters, is
only available to organizations with relatively significant
amounts of time and money to maintain continuous
content delivery to attract listeners. Further, webcasting
that is delivered ‘‘on-demand’’ (for example, corporate
Annual General Meetings are often available for online
listening at any time) is easier to produce than a radio
station’s ‘‘simulcast’’, yet must be sought out for consumption, whereas podcasting makes it much easier for a
creator to build an audience because consumers can
have the most recent content downloaded automatically.
Finally, because streaming generally uses synchronous
transmission and therefore requires embedded timecode information, it uses more bandwidth than asynchronous transmission, which means that the content
does not need to be delivered in the order in which it
will be listened to. 6 Podcasts are delivered asynchronously, and the lower bandwidth required results in
lower cost to the producer, making podcasting a relatively economical way to broadcast to a large audience. 7
There is also a legal difference between podcasting
and streaming in that podcasting involves the reproduction of works, since a new copy of the podcast is created
every time it is downloaded. Streaming, on the other
hand, does not involve reproduction. 8

Podcasting’s History and Future
A brief history of podcasting further provides context to the current legal aporia in which it sits, and can
help glimpse its future growth and development that
will need to be understood by creators, consumers and
regulators.
Podcasting developed out of ‘‘blogging’’, an Internet
phenomenon that originated in the 1990s, whereby individuals or groups regularly post content on a Web site.
Originally perceived as a sort of online diary, blogs today
usually focus on a particular subject and combine text,
images, and links to other online content. In a short
period of time, blogging has developed into a highly
pervasive cultural phenomenon that can have a large
impact on public opinion as well as the mass media.
Podcasting is now achieving a similar (if not faster)
growth trajectory. It became possible when Dave Winer
released version 2.0 of the RSS syndication format, which
allowed for syndication with attachments, such as the
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popular MP3 audio format. 9 Podcasting began in earnest
around August 2004 when Adam Curry, a former MTV
VJ, cobbled together a program that could automatically
download new MP3 files from RSS Web feeds into a
computer’s iTunes application, and have these automatically transferred to an iPod connected to the computer. 10
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Podcasting is growing at a phenomenal rate. In September 2004, prominent IT blogger Doc Searls discussed
podcasting and noted that at the time, googling ‘‘podcasts’’ returned only 24 hits, but predicted that ‘‘[a] year
from now, it will pull up hundreds of thousands, or
perhaps even millions’’. 11 At the time of writing this
article, googling ‘‘podcasts’’ resulted in 281 million hits.
While google hits by themselves could simply connote a
user fad or a just a lot of talk, one study predicts that the
audience of active podcast users will be 15 million by
2010 in the U.S.A. alone. 12 This exponential growth can
be attributed partly to Apple Computer, which boosted
the success of podcasts immensely by including an aggregator in its popular iTunes application, so that users of
iTunes can subscribe to podcasts from the same application they use to manage their music libraries.
It is not just the astronomical numerical growth of
podcasting that is notable. Equally important is the way
its use has expanded to include more than tech-cowboys
who view podcasting as a democratizing force or a sort
of pirate radio that allows individuals to broadcast free
from regulation and censorship. Podcasting is now mainstream enough to be used by major public radio stations
(the BBC in Britain, NPR in the USA, and CBC in
Canada) 13 as well as by businesses, 14 law firms, 15 educational institutions, 16 and religious organizations (giving
rise to the term ‘‘godcasting’’). 17 In Canada, the cellular
phone service provider Rogers Communications Inc.
introduced North America’s first mobile phone podcast
subscriptions. 18
Due to its growing popularity as a vehicle for delivering media content, it appears that podcasting has the
potential to become a viable business model. Early 2006
saw the first paid podcast subscriptions, and there will
surely be more attempts to go that route. 19 While podcasts are still untested as a money-making endeavour, a
clear advantage is that production costs are minimal; one
newspaper that sells podcast subscriptions of readings of
its stories reports a 40% margin. 20 If there is an analogy to
the development of other pay-for-access online content,
such as that of newspapers or magazines, we can expect
podcasts made by commercial entities to be made available for free until a critical mass of consumers makes it
viable to deliver them on a paid subscription basis.
In sum, podcasting is catching on as a method of
content delivery that resonates with a generation of users
who favour the advantages of being able to have their
preferred content delivered to them automatically for
enjoyment on their own time. Its distinct characteristics
make it easy and relatively inexpensive for everyday individuals to produce culturally pervasive programs and

reach a broader audience than would otherwise be possible. It also has the potential to become a viable business
model. All of these qualities are taken into account in the
following discussion of the legal environment in which
podcasting exists.

III. Copyright and Podcasting
Rights Engaged by Podcasting

M

usic included in a podcast is governed by the Copyright Act, which protects both economic and
moral rights in original artistic works. 21 This article
focuses on the economic rights involved in podcasting. A
typical podcast that contains music will involve the economic rights of the author of a work, as well as so-called
neighbouring rights of public performance and mechanical reproduction. 22 For example, if you were to play a
song by the Detroit Cobras, a popular underground
cover band, in your podcast, you would need permission
from the author who wrote the song, as well as from the
band members, who each get a right in their unique
performance, and lastly, from their record label who
owns the rights in the sound recording itself. The following is a brief description of these rights:
i. Author’s Rights
Subsection 3(1) of the Copyright Act covers what
are commonly referred to as ‘‘author’s’’ or ‘‘composer’s’’
rights. The section gives the holder of a copyright in a
work the sole right to produce, reproduce, perform, or
publish the work or any substantial part of the work.
This includes the sole right to make a sound recording of
a work and to communicate it to the public by way of
telecommunication. 23 A podcaster using a musical work
could clearly infringe copyright by reproducing a work
that somebody else created, and communicating it by
telecommunication to a subscriber.
ii. Performance Rights
Performers are granted rights in their unique interpretation of the authors’ compositions. Copyright exists
in the performer’s work, including the sole right to communicate the performance to the public by telecommunication and the right over reproductions of the fixation
of the performance other than those authorized by the
performer. 24 A podcast that plays a performance engages
the right of the performer to control the communication
of the performance. 25
iii. Sound Recording Rights
A sound recording is a recording fixed in any material form that consists of sounds, whether or not they are
the performance of a work. 26 This right is usually held by
the producer of a work, for example, a record company.
The maker of a sound recording has the sole right to
reproduce the recording in any material form. 27 Thus
the creator of a podcast, by reproducing a music
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recording in a podcast, also engages the rights of the
entity who made the sound recording that the podcaster
uses.
The Copyright Act states that holders of performance rights and sound recording rights have the right to
collect royalties when their work is played, and specifies
the division of such royalties. 28 It is also important to
note that neighbouring rights are independent of the
existence of underlying copyright in the music. For
example, you can have mechanical rights in a recording
of a public domain work (i.e., a work in which the original author no longer has copyright because the term for
copyright has expired). 29
In sum, a typical podcast would engage a minimum
of three rights: the rights of the author of a song; the
rights of the performer of the song; and the rights of the
maker of the sound recording. There might be more
rights holders involved, if, for example, there is more
than one writer of the song, a different lyricist, or multiple members of a band holding separate parts of the
performance rights. Thus, the seemingly simple activity
of reproducing a single copy of a song in a podcast
actually requires the permission of numerous entities.
While this task is made easier by the existence of collective rights management agencies, this minefield of intellectual property would likely be difficult for the average
podcaster to navigate, to say the least. The next section
discusses the current regime of licensing music in
Canada as it applies to podcasting.

The Copyright Board statutorily fixes the fees that
SOCAN charges for the license of its music repertoire. 32
Currently, there is no approved tariff that covers podcasting, which naturally creates a problem for podcasters
who wish to legally use SOCAN-controlled musical content. SOCAN is working to solve this problem, and has a
proposal before the Copyright Board that would cover
podcasting. Tariff 22, ‘‘Communications of Musical
Works via The Internet or Similar Transmission Facilities’’, 33 targets Web sites offering music content, granting
‘‘a licence to communicate to the public by telecommunication musical works forming part of SOCAN’s repertoire . . . by means of Internet transmissions or similar
transmission facilities’’. 34

IV. Licensing Music for Use in a
Podcast

Such a debate is perhaps pointless as far as the noncommercial podcaster is concerned, because for each category there is a minimum monthly fee of $200 that
applies regardless of whether or not the person using
copyrighted material makes any revenue from the use of
the works. 37 Under the proposed license, a podcaster
would pay a minimum of $2,400 per year if podcasting
fell under category 1 or 7. Should this change, however,
different minimum fees for different categories could
pose further challenges for podcasters, since a podcast
can be either streamed from its source, downloaded on
demand (for example, if one were to download back
episodes of a podcast to which one has recently subscribed), or downloaded automatically via a subscription.
If a different fee were applied to any of those uses,
SOCAN and other collective rights management agencies would need to specify into which category podcasting falls. As it stands now, however, any podcaster
would be expected to pay $2,400 in order to use any
piece of music by an artist represented by SOCAN,
regardless of whether a podcaster uses whole songs or
merely a snippet as an introduction to a talk-based podcast.

B

ecause copyright is divided up based on the nature
of the use involved, a podcaster wishing to include a
musical work in a podcast would have to get authorization from a number of sources. In most cases, the rights
to the music in question can be licensed from collective
rights management (CRM) bodies. CRM bodies exist
because it is usually not feasible for copyright holders to
license rights on an individual basis; thus, it is necessary
to split the administration costs of collecting royalties
among many copyright holders.

Performance Rights
In Canada, the Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) is the most prominent body dealing with public performance and telecommunication rights. Composers and authors of works
can choose to assign their rights to public performance
and telecommunication to SOCAN, which licenses the
works to various entities for myriad uses ranging from
the obvious (commercial radio) to the more obscure
(telephone ‘‘on-hold’’ music). 30 In return, it collects royalties from licensees, which it passes on to the composers,
lyricists, and publishers after taking a fee for the administration of the rights. 31

The fee for the license varies depending on the use.
Podcasting could fall under category 1, ‘‘Music Sites’’,
which applies to ‘‘communications from Sites or Services
that permit a User to select and listen to, reproduce for
later listening, or both listen to and reproduce for later
listening, a musical work or part of a musical work’’. 35
One could debate whether podcasting meets this definition, for example, on the grounds that the license
requires a user to ‘‘select’’ music and therefore may only
apply to ‘‘point-and-click’’ listening or downloading, and
not podcasts, which are delivered automatically by subscription. If this is the case, podcasting would likely be
caught by the general wording of category 7, which
applies to communications of musical works from a site
or service other than one mentioned in the other categories. 36

While SOCAN used to offer voluntary licenses for
$600 that podcasters could use until a tariff is approved,
these licenses are no longer available. 38 The public hearings for the proposed Tariff 22 are scheduled for April
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2007, leaving podcasters in a legal umbra for the time
being. 39
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Reproduction Rights
An author’s or publisher’s rights to reproduce a
musical work are managed in Canada mainly by the
Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency
(CMRRA). This organization operates similarly to
SOCAN and issues licenses to anyone who wishes to
reproduce a work on a CD or audiocassette (mechanical
rights), or as part of a soundtrack to an audiovisual production (synchronization rights). 40
Currently, the CMRRA does not have a statutory
license for podcasters, but licenses songs for podcast distribution based on a tariff that it has proposed to the
Copyright Board. 41 This proposed tariff would apply to
‘‘online music services’’, which are services that allow
users to receive streams or download sound recordings
embodying musical works. This tariff does not distinguish between types of online content delivery, so it
would apply equally to webcasters, downloading services,
and podcasters. CMRRA would grant a license to
reproduce music in CMRRA’s repertoire for royalties
amounting to the greater of 15% of gross revenue of their
service or 10 cents per permanent download of a single
musical work embodied in a sound recording. 42 As an
example, a podcaster who uses five songs in a podcast
would owe the CMRRA 50 cents in royalties per
download of that podcast. If this podcaster had 100 subscribers and produced 50 podcasts per year (i.e., approximately weekly), the fees collectible would be $2,500.
Given that many podcasts garner subscriptions exponentially greater than that, 43 a non-commercial podcaster
could incur some very significant costs in this area of
licensing.

Sound Recording Rights
Rights to use a sound recording are usually held by
the record companies that produced the recording. A
podcaster would need to get permission to use the
sound recording from the relevant record company for
each song used in a podcast. 44 In some cases, it may be
possible to negotiate a master use license rather than to
negotiate licenses on a per-song basis, but record companies are not obligated to do so 45 because they are not
subject to a statutory licensing scheme such as those
applying to author’s rights and performance rights. Further, it appears that record companies have little or no
interest in licensing their recordings for use in podcasts
at the present time. 46 When record companies do license
music for online purposes, they have required that it be
subject to ‘‘digital rights management’’ (DRM) measures. 47 This DRM requirement could increasingly apply
in the future: the United States, which already has a
statutory licensing scheme for the digital performance of
sound recordings, makes the use of DRM a condition of
eligibility for the license. 48

Administrative Obligations
Not only will it be necessary for podcasters to pay
tariffs to the appropriate licensing bodies, but there are
also administrative requirements. For example, SOCAN’s
proposed license requires that licensees submit, ‘‘where
applicable’’, a report detailing the number of users, the
gross revenues, and gross operating expenses for the
month. Licensees must also provide SOCAN quarterly
reports with:
detailed information from licensee’s site or service usage logs
concerning the transmission of all musical works from the
site . . . [identifying] each musical work by title, composer/writer, author, artist, record label, and unique identifier (e.g., ISWD, ISAN etc.) length, type of use (i.e., theme,
background or feature performance) and the manner of
performance (i.e., instrumental or vocal), and specify the
number of times each musical work was transmitted and
whether the work was streamed or otherwise
downloaded. 49

SOCAN also reserves the right to audit the
licensee’s books upon ‘‘reasonable notice’’ in order to
verify the reported use information and the fees rendered. 50 It is understandable that licensing bodies have a
strong desire to closely monitor the use and distribution
of material in their repertoires online; however, it is also
clear that the above reporting requirements are onerous
for individuals.

Other Considerations
Since 1997, the United Nations World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) has been overseeing
work on a proposed Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasts and Broadcasting Organizations. 51 The main effect
of this treaty would be to give broadcasters property
rights in the recording, retransmission, and reproduction
of their broadcast signals, even if the broadcast is of a
non-original work (i.e., a work that would not normally
be susceptible to copyright). Various drafts of the Treaty
would also have it apply to webcasting (including podcasting). At this point it appears that provisions relating
to webcasting will be taken out and put into a draft
proposal for a separate instrument to cover webcasting
and simulcasting rights. 52 Regardless of whether the
rights are packaged with traditional broadcasting or
whether they are covered in a webcasting-specific treaty,
it appears that copyright in webcasting is a definite possibility.
The proposed new rights in the Treaty have been
seen by many as a threat to podcasting, on the basis that,
among other things, such rights are not necessary for
Internet-based broadcasting to flourish; rather, they will
inhibit its growth by limiting even fair use of material, or
applying copyright to Creative Commons works that
were not intended to carry such restrictions on their
use. 53 Further, the intent of the Treaty is to combat signal
piracy, but that risk is very different in the contexts of
broadcasting and podcasting. 54 At least one commentator also believes that the Treaty would be unconstitu-
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tional if implemented in the United States on the
grounds that it would create new copyright-like rights
over unoriginal material. 55 Canada does not have a similar copyright clause in its constitution, but the fact
remains that international treaty rights covering copyright in podcasts could chill the growth of the medium
by making legal distribution more difficult, and also putting up one more hurdle that podcast creators must
consider when drawing on works to put in their podcasts.

V. Challenges to the Licensing
System
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t is evident that the current licensing regime is likely
unpalatable to many podcasters who desire to use
music in their shows. While public broadcasting institutions or private commercial entities would have the
capacity to investigate and understand the legal implications of podcasting as well as the capacity to pay for
music licenses, many podcasts are produced by individuals without such capacities.
These non-commercial 56 podcasters face a number
of barriers. First, the fragmentation of copyright can be
confusing to anyone not versed in copyright or involved
in the music industry. Many podcasters may not realize
that there are multiple rights-holders involved in the
playing of even part of one song. Second, the various
rights may be held by any one of a potentially bewildering array of collective rights management organizations. 57 The discussion of podcast licensing above is
merely illustrative and covers only the most prominent
CRM bodies; there are many others who could be
involved. 58
Third, once a podcaster navigates the issue of who
holds what rights, and the myriad licensing organizations, another issue is that there is currently no statutory
license that covers podcasting. This is understandable; as
with many new technologies, the law in this area is
lagging behind the current state of usage. However, given
the rapid growth of podcasting, it is doubtless that the
various collective rights management organizations will
come up with solutions to this problem, as illustrated by
the proposals put forward by SOCAN and CMRRA. A
fourth and more important challenge is that, assuming
the Copyright Board approves SOCAN’s and CMRRA’s
proposed licenses, the costs under the various proposed
tariffs would likely be prohibitive to a podcaster who
creates and distributes podcasts on a non-commercial
basis. Further, if such costs do not present too great a
barrier to a non-commercial podcaster, the administrative requirements of dealing with various licensing agencies may be too time-consuming or give rise to privacy
concerns. Lastly, if those hurdles can be overcome, there
is no guarantee that the record companies holding
sound recording rights will grant permission to use songs
in podcasts.
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The Need for a Different Model
Any licensing scheme in Canada should take into
account the purpose of copyright law in Canada, which
is to balance the dual objectives of ensuring a just reward
for the creators of works and promoting the public
interest in being able to access copyrighted works. 59 Further, in general, unless CRM bodies find ways to effectively license material for online use, they may see their
scope of operations and influence diminish over time. 60
Given these considerations, the problems faced by podcasters point to the need for a different model for
licensing music for use in podcasts. While there have
been numerous suggestions of alternatives to the current
copyright regime online (some of which are briefly discussed below), podcasting embodies a particularly apposite set of characteristics that militate in favour of
exploring ways to not only protect rights holders’ interests, but also to expand the use of music to foster the
growth of podcasting’s potential role in cultural production and the economy.
The reasons why a licensing regime should be especially sensitive to podcasters relate back to podcasting’s
unique characteristics as a method of online content
delivery, such as time-shifting and subscription-based
delivery. 61 These and other characteristics, when taken
together, show that podcasting has a cultural and utilitarian value which exceeds that of webcasting and P2P file
sharing: it is distinct in ways that make it less of a threat
to copyright and more valuable to society. The licensing
regime must take these characteristics into account if it is
to continue to effectively meet the balancing goals of
copyright law in Canada. In short, the unique nature of
podcasting supports the proposition that licenses for
podcasting should not be granted on the same terms as
for online commercial radio stations or music download
sites.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of podcasting is its accessibility. As opposed to conventional
Web-radio, which requires institutional resources and
around-the-clock content, podcasting can be created by
individuals on their own time. Even though webcasting
can be easily created and delivered on-demand, it differs
from podcasting in that it lacks the counterpart to accessibility: reach. Because of podcasting’s subscription element, it can reach more people through syndication and
flexible consumption.
Podcasting’s accessibility and reach is easily visible:
as an outgrowth of blogging, podcasting has a strong
community element and exhibits a very high level of
cultural relevance as measured by the extent of its popularity, whereas webcasting does not have a similar grassroots cultural relevance. Ultimately, podcasting’s democratization of content creation and distribution has the
benefit of decentralizing cultural production. The current model of copyright as a way to create markets for
intellectual property has led to a concentration of cultural production in the hands of a few media corpora-
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tions, as well as significant portions of royalties going to
these intermediaries. 62 Podcasting helps contribute to a
vibrant cultural industry, which furthers important noneconomic values. 63
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Of course, accessibility and reach alone do not
make podcasting particularly special: P2P downloading
is both accessible and pervasive. The value that podcasting presents beyond P2P file sharing lies in its public
and promotional nature. P2P users try to remain anonymous and use file sharing services as a sort of swap
market, offering some content in return for other content. Many podcasters, on the other hand, see their role
as beneficial to the artists and cultural community that
they cover in their shows. 64 This relates back to podcasting’s growth out of the blogging community: podcasters undertake their work to promote and discuss interests about which they are passionate. The promotional
capacity of podcasts is helped by the fact that podcasters
have the role of authorities or leaders in the subjects that
they cover — similar to how magazines or radio shows
can influence the public. Podcast subscribers, for their
part, listen to podcasts not to get music to burn onto
CDs or to mix into playlists, but to hear the latest bands
or news.
The obvious counterargument to this view is that
enthusiasm has never been a defence to copyright
infringement, and we should not create such a defence.
However, from a utilitarian perspective it can be said
that podcasting has the potential to provide greater
overall utility if non-commercial podcasters are not prevented from accessing copyright works by the economic
and administrative demands of the licensing regime.
Podcasting can undeniably serve a promotional purpose
that increases public awareness of artists in a way that is
more targeted than conventional online radio (because
of the podcasting’s subscription nature), and more effective than P2P downloading: because P2P file-sharing is
usually anonymous, it is difficult to believe that those
users engage in that practice in order to promote the
artists whose works they upload; but the opposite is so of
podcasting.
Thus, given the specific cultural role that podcasting
plays (and has the potential to play) within society, it can
be argued that podcasters are creating an important cultural product and performing a service that increases
Canada’s cultural resources. Whether or not this argument can be expected to hold any weight with copyright
policymakers and legislators is questionable: in the educational context, even though there is a significant cultural value involved in giving students and teachers
access to works, there are very few exceptions to use of
copyrighted work in the educational sphere. However, it
is important to note that the context in which podcasting sits differs in two significant ways from the educational context. First, this paper is not arguing that
exceptions to copyright should be created for podcasting,
but rather that due to the cultural value and business
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potential of podcasting, it should be covered by a
licensing regime that ensures its continued growth at the
non-commercial level. Second, while in the educational
context the benefit can be seen as resting primarily with
the end user, in the online environment a podcaster is
not only a user of copyrighted works but is also a distributor, so the promotional element of podcasting is much
greater.
A further difference from P2P downloading is that
works distributed through podcasting are less likely to
result in further rampant file-sharing of the Napster or
Limewire varieties. Music on podcasts appears as part of
a ‘‘show’’, and may even come in the form of an incomplete song, be used as background music, or be otherwise lacking in integrity. Despite the fears of rights
holders, even whole, high-quality songs on a podcast are
not susceptible to being transferred out of the podcast
onto other playlists or media such as an iPod or burned
onto a CD, simply because the effort involved in editing
a song out of a podcast is not worth it when the same
song can be found legally for 99 cents on iTunes or
illegally for free on a file-sharing service. 65
Because of the above characteristics of podcasting,
the balancing that goes on in copyright law shows a
significant value in ensuring that the licensing system
gives non-commercial podcasters affordable and straightforward access to works. The next section discusses why
such a suggestion is also beneficial to rights holders.

Is the Current Model of Copyright Good
for Rights Holders?
The above argument that podcasting serves a valuable cultural function may be skeptically received by
rights holders who worry that online distribution of
their works via podcast could eat into royalty revenues
from other sources. However, a licensing regime that
effectively forecloses legal participation by the community of Internet user-producers who can be credited with
podcasting’s creation and initial growth is also less than
optimal from a business perspective. Collective rights
management agencies seek to secure the fullest amount
of royalties due to the artists in their repertoires, yet risk
losing a potential source of license fees.
Under the licensing regime as it appears right now,
a podcaster has one of three options: pay the licensing
fees to SOCAN, CMRRA and any other relevant bodies;
not use works that are controlled by collective rights
management agencies (by getting permission directly
from the artists or using ‘‘podsafe’’ music); or use copyrighted content illegally. Given the difficulty and
expense of going through the licensing process, it seems
probable that many, if not most, non-commercial podcasters will not choose to get licenses for the content
they use. Rather, it seems common for podcasters to
choose to use works that are not subject to CRM
licenses. For example, CBC Radio 3 produces a weekly
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hour-long podcast that is perpetually near the top of
iTunes’ rankings of its most subscribed-to podcasts.
However, it does not license its music through any collective rights management agency. It gets its content
from bands that join the New Music Canada Web site, a
CBC affiliated organization that promotes Canadian
independent music. When they join, artists can give permission for their music to be used in Radio 3 podcasts.
The podcasts of another popular podcaster, MarieChantalle Turgeon of Montreal, have been listed by Spin
Magazine 66 as one of the five best podcasts to download,
yet she does not license her music either. She simply gets
permission to play music from the artists that she uses in
her podcasts. 67
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A related option available to podcasters is to use socalled ‘‘podsafe’’ music, a term that has arisen to broadly
describe any work whose licensing requirements allow it
to be used for free in a podcast, often while reserving the
rights to impose more traditional constraints on other
users. 68 The term also covers obvious cases of music that
can be used legally, such as public domain works (apart
from public performance or sound recording rights) and
Creative Commons works. 69
The third option that podcasters have is to use copyrighted content illegally, that is, without paying licensing
organizations or getting permission from the rights
holders and record companies themselves. Although in
the early days of podcasting this practice was more
common, it will increasingly diminish. The growth of
podcasting, not only in use but also in the public eye and
on the radar of industry and CRMs, has led to a much
greater awareness of the legal issues involved and the risk
of infringing copyright. 70 In particular, there is a growing
litigation risk that will affect the willingness and ability
of podcasters to use any music they want. 71 Podcasters
usually create their shows in order to distribute them to
the public, which is a more overt and traceable action
than distributing copyrighted music through P2P channels. Thus the greater threat of legal action, which is
compounded by the fear of unintended infringement
simply due to the difficulty of understanding the
licensing system, leads to the conclusion that this sort of
use is not an ideal option for non-commercial and amateur podcasters.
Examination of these options points to podsafe
music or non-CRM licenses as the preferable option for
podcasters who wish to use music in their episodes. This
poses a challenge to Canada’s prevailing licensing system
because rights holders who wish to have their works
widely used and promoted (thereby earning more royalties) will miss out on a large and growing body of userproducers who are enthusiastic about music and who
could be contributing to artists’ incomes. Thus, from a
utilitarian perspective of copyright there is a significant
amount of economic gain to be had through increased
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royalties if a way can be found to encourage the legal use
of copyrighted material in podcasts.
Further, if podcasting becomes a viable business
model, the current licensing regime risks missing out on
a sizeable portion of the market for musical works, and
therefore, sizeable royalties for creators of works used in
podcasts. The nature of production and distribution of
podcasts is such that almost anyone can become a producer and distributor without too much expense. This
means that there is a wealth of creative potential to
harness, some of which could end up being profitable.
An example is the Ricky Gervais show, which began as a
free show but which went commercial due to its incredible popularity. 72 The nature of Internet distribution is
such that word of mouth and non-traditional forms of
promotion can unexpectedly turn a non-commercial
podcast into a product with global subscribership. If podcasters are restricted to using podsafe music, then in the
event that a podcast does turn into a commercial
endeavour the artists belonging to various licensing
bodies stand to lose out on potential revenue that could
be gained from licensing music to such podcasts. More
generally, if the legal environment surrounding podcasting is too onerous it may stifle podcasting at the
grassroots level, leaving a smaller pool from which profitable podcasts can develop.
Finally, the SOCAN and CMRRA licenses, as they
have been proposed to the Copyright Board, may not be
as effective as desired. Since the proposed tariffs are
directed towards the Web sites that offer music, 73 and
not particular legal personalities, it seems possible to circumvent the spirit of the licensing requirements.
SOCAN’s Tariff 22 proposal, for example, grants licenses
to ‘‘sites’’ or ‘‘services’’, which are defined as ‘‘a site or
service accessible via the Internet or a similar transmission facility from which content is transmitted to Users’’.
There is no specification that the site or service in question must be operated by a single individual or legal
personality such as a corporation. On this basis, it would
appear to be legal if a group of people formed a cooperative to run a Web site, pooling their money to be
able to pay the $2,400 minimum license fee and then
offering podcasts or individual songs for download
online. One could foresee this being particularly feasible
and appealing to students in a university residence, for
example.
In sum, there are a number of weaknesses in the
licensing system that could be undesirable from the perspective of rights holders, because the barriers to use of
copyrighted music by non-commercial podcasters have
the potential to result in lost royalties that could be
received from this area of use. Thus, from a utilitarian
perspective the copyright licensing regime partially
defeats the interests it sets out to protect.
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VI. Alternatives to the Current
Model

T

he above discussion illustrates how the current
licensing regime, while working to adapt to the new
technology of podcasting, still is not meeting its potential
to maximize rights holder interests and the interests of
podcasters and the listening public. Beyond the challenges to the licenses that are or will be available, there is
the further issue of licensing sound recording rights from
the record companies — an even bigger barrier because
licenses must be negotiated on an individual basis. 74
With these challenges in mind, this section briefly discusses various proposals for alternatives to the current
copyright system.
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A Podcast-Specific Tariff
An obvious solution directly tailored for podcasters
would be to simply change the current licenses offered
by CRM bodies to give podcasting its own tariffs that
take into account its unique technology and advantages.
Podcasting is different enough from other methods of
delivering content online that there are ample reasons to
not lump it in with webcasting or downloading services
for licensing purposes.
A tariff directed at podcasting could offer different
types of licenses directed at different users of copyrighted
material. One type could be along the lines of the proposals currently before the copyright board. Another
type could involve lower fees and be available only to
non-commercial podcasters. To appease fears that individuals paying reduced fees would then be unfairly
favoured relative to institutional or commercial entities
that produce podcasts, a non-commercial license could
involve more limited rights to the material — perhaps by
restricting the catalogue of works available to be used, or
restricting the number of songs that can be used in a
given time period. A non-commercial license might also
be terminable such that if its subscribership passes a
certain threshold, the podcaster must pay for the standard license.
The disadvantage of this idea is that, apart from
whether or not SOCAN or CMRRA would be amenable
to such a suggestion, it would lead to further fragmentation of copyright. Breaking down the licensing of copyrighted works based on the use to which they are put
(for example, differentiating streaming from podcasting)
adds inefficiency and increased expense to the work of
CRM bodies in administering the rights. 75 Further, collective licensing is only workable to the extent that users
of copyright works are able to use the works in the way
that they want. 76 Because technology blurs the lines
between different uses, it is less than ideal from the
perspective of podcasters or CRM bodies to attempt to
pigeonhole podcasting as a use. Two examples can illustrate this: first, as mentioned above, an end user can
access the content of a podcast through streaming,

clicking to download, or automatic download through
subscription. Second, consider such technology as the
iFill, a product that records streamed Internet radio
directly onto an iPod. 77 This device obviously poses
problems for differentiated licenses that are based on the
way music is distributed — a webcaster paying for a
public performance right could suddenly find itself in
breach of a copyright holder’s reproduction rights if its
content is being reproduced on iPods using the iFill.
Another problem, one that is not limited to this
particular licensing option, is that it would not get
around the problem podcasters face in licensing sound
recordings from record companies. The current system
predominantly involves collective rights management
bodies that license music, and those bodies exist because
of market failure at the individual level: it is not worth
the time and expense for an individual artist to collect
royalties for the artist’s work, and not worth users’ time
and expense to track down individual copyright holders
to clear the rights involved in use. 78 This logic does not
apply to the record companies that hold rights in sound
recordings, because there is a concentration of ownership that means each company has significant clout on
its own to enforce its rights, and further clout in the form
of the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA)
which represents the interests of record companies
through lobbying, public awareness, and litigation. 79

Extended Licensing
Another option is extended licensing, which
involves legislatively granting an extended effect to the
agreements that CRM bodies have with the artists they
represent. This extension is the authority to administer
the rights even of rights-owners who are not members of
the CRM body in question. 80 This allows users of copyrighted works to be comfortable with the assurance that
every work they use relating to a certain field and right
(for example, the performance right in music) is subject
to the same terms as set out by the CRM body administering the right. 81 Extended licensing is already used in
Nordic countries, and is usually provided for in the Copyright Act of the country. 82
A Canadian version of extended licensing is the
Extended Repertoire System (ERS), proposed by Daniel
Gervais. 83 This system is very similar to the current collective rights management system that predominates in
Canada today, but with the extended reach described
above: instead of artists opting in to a collective rights
management body and granting the body permission to
administer rights on that basis, the ERS involves a statutorily mandated opt-out system: a collective rights management organization would automatically have the
authority to grant licenses and administer the rights for
all artists unless an artist specifically chose not to be
represented by the collective. 84 Collectives would get this
authority from the Copyright Board, who could certify a
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collective if it could show that it currently represented a
significant portion of artists for a given use (e.g., performance rights, reproduction rights), and if the Board determined that it would be in the public interest to grant the
collective the capacity to represent all rights holders concerned. 85
The advantages of Gervais’ Extended Repertoire
System are that it is not a great departure from the
current system and might therefore be seen as a realistic
option to policy makers and legislators considering copyright reform. It does not change who would require a
license to use works, nor does it change the existing
exceptions to copyright (such as the fair dealing exception). 86 It simply extends the authority of collectives to
represent more artists so that they can have the mass to
effectively perform their licensing functions. The ERS
also would meet the needs of users of copyright music
because a user would be more likely to pay a small fee if
he or she knew that such fee covered virtually all artists
whose work would be used.
The major disadvantage of the ERS is that it
remains to be seen whether it would reduce costs to
users in Canada — something that this paper argues is
necessary if music-based podcasts are to thrive. The
extended licensing regimes used in Nordic countries are
effective, and it certainly appears that by extending the
authority of collectives to represent all rights holders
concerned, it may be possible to get a significant portion
of the population to pay for licenses, and such a demand
might enable a lower optimal price point at which royalty revenues would be maximized. However, this would
need to be explored more in a Canadian-specific context.

Tax or Levy Schemes
A more extreme suggestion to solve the digital copyright dilemma is to impose a tax or levy on users. An
example is the system proposed by William Fisher III,
who finds that in the digital age, our current method of
protecting music and film, through government protection of private suppliers against competition from
copiers, is no longer the optimal way to encourage production of such goods. 87 Instead, he proposes a system
whereby a creator who wished to collect revenue for his
or her work would register it with the Copyright
Office. 88 The Copyright Office would then give the work
a unique filename, which it would use to track transmissions of the work. The government would raise taxes
sufficient to compensate creators for the use of their
work, and distribute shares of this tax revenue to creators
based on the popularity of their work as determined by
the tracking system in place. 89
While Fisher asserts that the most economically
sound approach is to use income tax to achieve the goals
of the system, other scholars have suggested different
methods of collecting revenue. For example, Professor
Netanel proposes placing a levy on goods and services
whose value is increased by digital file-sharing. 90 Pro-

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

fessor Yu proposes a somewhat similar scheme that
would place levies on ISPs and certain electronic equipment. 91
The advantages of such a system are that consumers
would pay less for more entertainment, 92 and artists
would be fairly compensated because there would be
less illegal use of their material and the taxation or levy
system would ensure that they received the royalties they
were due. 93 Further, musicians would benefit by being
less dependent on record companies for their income,
and less money would be retained by those
intermediaries. 94 There would also be a benefit to both
creators and consumers in the form of decreased litigation and other transaction costs. 95
There are also disadvantages of a tax or levy-based
system of compensating artists in order to allow
expanded uses such as allowing music to be distributed
through podcasts. First, SOCAN has already unsuccessfully attempted to impose a sort of levy with its first
Tariff 22 proposal, which it intended to apply to Internet
service providers. 96 It appears that any move in that
direction would require significant legislative impetus to
succeed. Second, Jeremy deBeer points out that a tax or
levy-based regime in the Canadian context might run
into constitutional problems, and questions whether the
federal government has the power to legislate such a
scheme. 97 deBeer’s other objections include philosophical 98 international treaty, 99 and cross-subsidization 100;
grounds. These and other objections 101 are on top of the
logistical challenges that setting up such a system would
present.

The Way Forward
The above discussion presents three options that
attempt to tackle the problem of protecting copyright in
the online context. All of them would present advantages
for podcasting by allowing podcasters to use music with
fewer burdens than those proposed by the current
licensing regime. However, all also present disadvantages
that society may not be ready to accept.
With this in mind, two steps should be taken to
create a licensing scheme that is amenable to podcasting.
First, because podcasting is currently in legal limbo when
it comes to music licensing, a relatively quick solution is
needed: the CRM bodies should create a license that
reduces the fees payable by non-commercial podcasters
to use music in their programs. This should, however,
only be a temporary solution. As discussed above, it is
not desirable to license music according to how it is
used, and technologies will continually present new uses
that further fragment copyright or that blur the lines
between uses. In the long term, Canada should work
towards an extended licensing scheme of the variety
proposed by Gervais. Such a scheme is not very far conceptually from the current licensing regime for musical
works, and has the potential to reduce licensing fees for
podcasters while also ensuring that copyright holders are
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duly compensated. A tax or levy scheme, on the other
hand, faces more obstacles from a political, legislative
and administrative perspective.

VII. Conclusion

P

odcasting is an emerging technology that is unique
in its method of distributing audio-visual content
and in its speedy growth and popularity. However, like
other forms of online content, it brings the possibility of
copyright infringement and the need to ensure that creators of works and other rights holders are sufficiently
protected. There is a concomitant need to make works
sufficiently available to society in order to meet the balancing purpose of copyright. While Canada is in the
process of expanding its current licensing regime to
include podcasting, the proposed licenses from leading
collectives such as SOCAN and CMRRA will create an
inhospitable environment for the growth of music-based
podcasting, especially those podcasters who do not earn
any revenues from their podcasts.

Taking into account podcasting’s unique technological, economic, and cultural characteristics, it is evident
that there is a need for a change to the licensing regime
if podcasting is going to fulfill its potential as a business
model and cultural resource. This change should first
come in the form of tariffs specific to podcasting that
would make works more affordable, and move towards
an extended licensing system that gives CRM bodies the
authority to license more works, with an eye towards
reducing license fees payable by users of copyrighted
works. If change does not come, music-based podcasting
will be the domain of commercial entities and public
institutions. Non-commercial podcasters using musical
content will be outside of the mainstream, and talkbased podcasts will form the vast majority of non-profit
podcast content. One thing though, seems certain — the
future will bring more innovative methods of content
delivery and the copyright regime will need to adapt in
one way or another.
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